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DESIGNING THE L-lOll TO MINIMIZE
ROTOR FAILURE EFFECTS
J. E. Wignot
Lockheed California Co. "
Despite the considerable emphasis on containment, and the effort spent
in analysis, research, and design development testing in attempting to achieve
]
same, the experience of the aircraft industry is that an uncontained fragment
of significant size and energy is to be anticipated at some time in the life
of an aircraft type. In recognition of this fact, the Federal Aviation Regula-
tion Special Propulsion Condition P-I states, in part: "The airplane must
incorporate design features to minimize hazardous damage to the airplane in
the event of an engine rotor failure ..." The L-1011 incorporates numerous
design features that provide a high level of protection against rotor fragments.
Some of these features are reviewed herein.
Protection against rotor fragments may be provided in one or more of the
following ways: (i) By incorporating design features into the rotor that tend _
!to pro_ te small fragments if failure occurs, (2) By containing the fragments
within the engine shell or greatly reducing the energy content of those fragments
that are eventually uncontained, (3) By shielding vulnerable elements or systems
. / with heavy structural members that tend to stop or deflect high velocity fragments,
i _ and (4) By incorporating redundant and/or "backup" systems into the basic design
and separating these systems so as to minimize the probability that more than
O
one system will be damaged by an uncontained rotor fragment. The L-1011 utilizes •
all of these design philosophies.
_. Some of the design features that have been incorporated into the Rolls-Royce
$
RB211 engine are discussed briefly and two in-service experiences are considered
in order to illustrate the practical operation of these features. The penalties
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that would be imposed by trying to design for 100% containment are assessed.
Designing for 100% containment is found to be: (i) less effective than a
rational integration of all technique_ and (2) prodigally wasteful of our energy
resources.
The aircraft systems such as flight controls, engine controls, fuel, hydraulic,
and electrical control systems are considered and shown to be located and multipli-
cated so as to maximize the protection and availability of these vital systems.
Special attention is given to the location of fuel lines, fuel shut-off valves,
and the fuel valve control systems to minimize fire hazard.
Secondary equipment possessing high speed rotating elements are reviewed
to illustrate the design philosphies followed, the design features utilized, and
the in-::ervice results attained.
The L-1011 has, to date accumulated clos_ tu a million flight hours with
an excellent safety record showing the viability of the design philosophy
utilized in designing the L-IOll to minimize rotor failure effects.
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DISCUSSION
G. Gunstone, CAA-UK
I would like to ask Mr. Wignot if he could give some indication of the
cost he feels has been allocated in the i011 design against meeting the frag-
ment protection requirement. In other words, trying to estimate the cost
effectiveness of various solutions, what penalty is he paying now for having
had to design the airplane the way it is, or would the aircraft have been just
the same without a containment requirement?
J.E. Wignot, Lockheed-California
I think that's a very fair question. I think the answer is that, to
date, the airplane proper has had very little weight added to it for contain-
ment. The additional weight that is associated with containment lies primarily
in the engine.
J.C. Wallin, BAC
I couldn't help noticing that in your statement you said that there were
certain systems, I think, that were protected by the structure. Now, that would
presume based on your philosophy that you were not going to have more than a
certain size disk piece coming out. I think that in an overall assessment (even
with the best will involved and the best that Denis and his boys can do to the
engine) one is unrealistic if one doesn't allow for the fact that one day there
could be a failure of a disk piece and I don't believe that any structure, how-
ever heavy, will stop a disk piece. Having said all that, I will say that in
our assessment, the L-IOll was one aircraft that would meet the current CAA
requirements without any changes.
-f
J J.E. Wi_no.t, Lockheed-Cal.
I want to thank Mr. Wallin for his comments and to acknowledge the
_' pertinence of his question. Yes, we do have to face up to the possibility that
a large fragment of a disk may be released. But after all, it's a matter of
probability, isn't it? And here we're talking about the probability that we
_ will have a bit of a disk come out, escape with the proper energy in the correct
_ direction and do more than the damage that we have anticipated.
I would llke to add that although philosophically we have to accept a
rotor fragment size of one-third of the disk, it has been demonstrated many
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times that when a contributing problem is recognized, such as excitation of
the lower disk modes by partial local blockage, it is possible to alter the
design to promote smaller fragment productlon in the event of a failure. It
would be hoped that through the efforts of this group, that the technology
base and the theoretical base that is developed will tend to make the prob-
ability of the release of a third of a disk negligible. If we design so as
%
to keep the rotor burst fragments small it makes all the other design problems
that much easier.
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